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Apologetics

Ramadan: Television, and Fasting during the Olympic Games

Martin Marty Center for the Advanced Study of Religion
The University of Chicago Divinity School

Sightings  7/26/2012 

The Holy TV Season

— Ahmed Arshi

Ramadan, the ninth month of the lunar Islamic Calendar, has begun, lasting 29 or 30 days depending on the visual sightings of the crescent moon. In this month of fasting, Muslims hope for reward from God as they refrain from eating, drinking, and sexual relations from dawn until dusk. They also refrain from fighting and quarreling, and spend more time reciting the Qu’ran over longer stretches of time. Muslims fast in this month to demonstrate their submission to Allah and they offer more prayer than practiced in other months, as was the tradition of the prophet Mohammed.

In recent decades, a new aspect to Ramadan emerged: The start of the television series season which lasts only thirty days in the Middle East, unlike the American TV series season, which starts in September and ends in April the following year. One TV producer would produce over four TV series a year that would premiere during Ramadan. The competition for slots in the Ramadan season is high with over one hundred TV series to watch for the thirty days of Ramadan. This has become a Ramadan tradition, hand in hand with prayer, fasting and other devotional practices.

The topics of these TV series are the talk of the town in the daytime (while people are fasting) and it is common to discuss the plot, the acting, the script, and the directing during the day. “Is the show controversial? Is it violent? Is it Ramadani (exhibiting the spirit of Ramadan)?” Public opinion is now taken into consideration by network producers as these views are expressed on social networking sites, which has led to some difficult decisions like canceling a TV series mid-season. This occurred last Ramadan with TV series based on Islamic History.

Last year, a small production company from Kuwait produced a series that tells the story of the prophet Mohammed’s grandsons Al-Hassan and Al-Hussain, and how they handled the civil unrest that took place in the era of the third Caliph Othman Bin Afan, ending with his assassination by rebels. These events form a big part of Islamic history and are widely known to Muslims. The producers consulted Shi’ite and Sunni Scholars in order to wave away suspicions regarding the accuracy of the plotline. They were granted permission by scholars from both sects who analyzed the scripts. The show went on air during Ramadan, but a huge number of viewers opposed the series and tweeted their demand that the network stop broadcasting it. The network acquiesced.

One of the series coming out this Ramadan is standing out already. It tells the story of one of Islam’s most respected figures, the second Caliph to lead the Muslim Empire, Omar Bin Al-Khattab. The trailer of the series entitled Omar was released by the Middle East’s leading broadcast network MBC weeks before Ramadan. Viewers started campaigning against the series immediately, hoping to shut it down even before seeing it, with the excuse that it is inappropriate to portray the companions of the prophet Mohammed. Again, the producers have full approval from legitimate scholars, but the question remains: Will MBC cancel the series because of public unrest, which is not backed up by any supported argument? Or will they resume with their plans on airing this series?

Ahmed Arshi is a novelist and scriptwriter based in Abu Dhabi, the United Arab Emirates.

This month’s Religion & Culture Web Forum is entitled “Give me back my Children!”: Traumatic Reenactment and Tenuous Democratic Public Spheres by Mark Auslander. Every year, thousands of Americans re-enact Civil War battles, while tens of thousands more witness these restagings. But recent years have seen the rise of a different type of historical reenactment–the reenactment of “traumatic historical events related to slavery, race and power in American history.” Mark Auslander draws from fieldwork to describe three such reenactments: “the annual reenactment of a horrific 1946 mass lynching in Walton County, Georgia; the daily mounting of a ‘historical experience’ of slavery in Selma, Alabama; and a reenacted slave auction in St. Louis, Missouri.” Invoking a distinction formulated by Claude Levi-Strauss, Auslander proposes that traumatic reenactments can be understood as rites, which “produce sameness out of fundamental difference,” rather than as games, which produce difference out of sameness. Ultimately, however, traumatic reenactments according to Auslander engage “the classic problem of managing the unquiet dead … The living must labor to help relocate the wandering interstitial dead–to help move them along towards their proper place.” Read “Give me back my Children.”

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Sightings comes from the Martin Marty Center for the Advanced Study of Religion at the University of Chicago Divinity School.

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Sightings welcomes submissions of 500 to 750 words in length that seek to illuminate and interpret the intersections of religion and politics, art, science, business and education. 
Previous columns give a good indication of the topical range and tone for acceptable essays. The editor also encourages new approaches to current issues and events.

Attribution

Columns may be quoted or republished in full, with attribution to the author of the column, Sightings, and the Martin Marty Center at the University of Chicago Divinity School.

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The Ramadan Olympics and Islam’s “Law of Necessity”

Posted: 30 Jul 2012 08:33 AM PDT

This article first appeared with the Gatestone Institute.

Because Islam’s “Law of Necessity” fully permits Muslims to find creative ways to adapt when Sharia Law conflicts with practical life, the argument that societies are obliged to make concessions to privilege all the demands of strict Sharia Law is considerably weakened.

Islam Is a flexible religion: religious obligations allow exceptions, subject to circumstances. Muslim religious scholars balance countervailing obligations to determine when exceptions apply. Understanding such balancing of necessities in Islam is not only important for public policy, but also for understanding how an identical set of religious beliefs can be used to justify war or peace, terrorism or peaceful coexistence.

Fasting During a Ramadan Olympics

As the London Olympics are underway, London organizers of the Olympics, according to a report in the New York Times, are supporting the needs of Muslims athletes, “with more than 150 Muslim clerics on hand to assist athletes, as well as fast-breaking packs including dates and other traditional foods.”
As it is also the month of Ramadan, during which Muslims are obligated not to eat or drink, even their own saliva, from sunrise to sunset, spare a thought for the more than 3,500 Muslim competitors, who, if they strictly observed Ramadan, would be abstaining from food and drink from the first prayer of the day (Fajr) at 2.44 am through to the dusk prayer (Maghrib) at 8.53 pm (as at July 29, 2012, see Islamicfinder.org).
Optimum sporting performance cannot be expected from athletes who go without food or drink for over 18 hours — a circumstance which would not be fair to them.
Many Muslim Olympians now in London will therefore not be fasting. Some may rely on religious rulings (fatwas) which exempt sportspeople from the Ramadan fast, such as a ruling issued in 2010 by the German Central Council of Muslims, that Muslim professional footballers, because they depend upon football for their living, need not fast during Ramadan.
The United Emirates, using a different approach stated that players may omit the fast as long as they do not stay in one place for more than four days. This is based upon a standard exemption for travelers during Ramadan (Sahih Bukhari, 3:31:167). Another exemption, following advice from imams in Morocco, is being used by English Olympic rower Moe Sbihi, who announced that he will donate 60 meals to poor people in Morocco for each missed fast day. Many Olympic athletes are postponing their fasts until their sporting commitments are completed. However, the Moroccan football team are fasting and trusting that Allah will help them to victory. All Muslims agree that fasting is obligatory during Ramadan; they differ in the exceptions they make.

“Necessity”: Balancing What Is Forbidden with What Is Permitted

There is a powerful principle in Islamic jurisprudence, the “Law of Necessity,” that permits what is forbidden — the end justifying the means. If a goal is obligatory, then the means can also be obligatory, even if otherwise they might be forbidden.
In Islam the universe of possible human deeds is divided into what is obligatory, permitted neutral, disliked, or forbidden. Then there is the need to balance the pros and cons of every act. This is a world of choice which can embrace a necessary evil, or take a pass on a good deed for the sake of a greater good.
Some “Law of Necessity” exceptions go back to Muhammad; they are hard-wired into Islamic law. A case in point is the exemption for travelers during Ramadan, which some athletes rely on. Another exemption for travelers, which also comes straight from Muhammad, allows Muslims to catch up on prayer times later than the correct hour.
Life raises many complex challenges, and the balancing of obligations and prohibitions may require more subtle reasoning, dependent on context. The renowned medieval Muslim scholar al-Ghazali explained how the principle of balancing necessities can be used to make lying permitted or even compulsory, according to the circumstances:

“Speaking is a means to achieve objectives. If a praiseworthy aim is attainable through both telling the truth and lying, it is unlawful to accomplish it through lying because there is no need for it. When it is possible to achieve such an aim by lying but not by telling the truth, it is permissible to lie if attaining the goal is permissible … and obligatory to lie if the goal is obligatory . …” (The Reliance of the Traveller, p.745-46, paragraph r8.2)

Yusuf al-Qaradawy has written extensively about the jurisprudence of “balancing necessities.” He explains that interests and pros and cons of any deed must be balanced, one against each other and weighed carefully.
Al-Qaradawy’s focus was politics, not sport. He cited an example of the support given by the Islamist political leader Maulana Maududi to Fatima Jinnah in the 1965 presidential elections in Pakistan. Previously Maududi had declared that it was not permissible in Islam for a woman to govern (based on the teachings of Muhammad). He came, however, to regard Jinnah as the lesser of two evils, so he commanded his followers to vote for the female candidate, and against General Ayub Khan.
Understanding such balancing of necessities in Islam is important for public policy — to grasp how an identical set of religious beliefs can be used to justify war or peace, terrorism or peaceful coexistence — or any other decision, based solely on the circumstances at the time.

Balancing Necessities and Public Policy

Consider the issue of the timing of the Olympics: Was Juan Cole correct to suggest that the Olympic Games should be rescheduled so they did not fall in Ramadan?
The fact that the “Law of Necessity” allows Muslims to get around restrictions suggests that although it might certainly have been thoughtful or considerate, it would not in any way necessary to reschedule the Olympics for the sake of Muslim religious sensitivities.
The possibility of balancing necessities needs to be taken into account when organizations and governments are faced with demands that they make concessions for the sake of complying with Islamic Sharia Law. Because the Islamic “Law of Necessity” fully permits Muslims to find creative ways to adapt when Sharia law conflicts with practical life, the argument that societies are obliged to make concessions to privilege all the strict demands of Sharia Law is considerably weakened.
Non-Muslims in particular need to take balancing necessities into account. Consider Sheikh Ahmed al-Mahlawi of Egypt who accepts that it is not a sin for Muslim religious scholars to see women in the streets with unveiled faces: the need for Muslim scholars to get around in public places outweighs the prohibition against men seeing women’s unveiled faces. He boasted, all the same, that he had compelled a US consular official to wear the hijab[headscarf] when she met with him. If the U.S. official had been better informed, she might have asked that Sheikh al-Mahlawi take a more moderate, balanced approach. She might have refused to submit to thehijab, pointing out that the Sheikh copes very well with looking at the unveiled faces of women whenever he goes into the street.

Balancing Necessity and Terrorism

Al-Qaradawi concluded that although it is wrong in general for Muslims to participate in non-Islamic governments or to make alliances with non-Muslim nations, compromises may be made when such lesser evils are ‘balanced’ against the greater good of the Muslim cause.
He also made the observation that many of the conflicts between different factions working for the success of Islam exist because of different interpretations about how to “balance” the different necessities and interests in Islam. Of course, Muslims who agree on their fundamental principles of faith can have very different views on how to balance these beliefs in any given situation.
Jihadi [holy war] martyrs make use of theological balancing necessities when they justify their methods for killing enemies. In Islam, for example, it is forbidden to kill oneself, but suicide, if it can be justified in the cause of Allah or furthering Islam, is not only permissible but heroic. Jihadi clerics are more than willing to write fatwas which ensure that a would-be martyr goes to his death with a clear conscience.In Islam, it is forbidden to kill women and children, but “collateral damage” is acceptable if a greater end is in sight. It is also forbidden in Islam to lie, but it is recommended that a pious jihadi using taqiyya [dissimulation] if necessary to achieve, say, a “martyrdom operation.” The Al-Qaeda manual, for instsnce, appeals to the principle that “necessity permits the forbidden” to justify criminal acts; and the Indonesian jihad cleric Abu Bakar Bashir argued that jihadis were entitled to hack foreigner’s bank accounts to obtain funds (see The Crime-Terror Nexus, New York State Office of Homeland Security). (For a bizarre example of the extremes to which jihad fatwas can go, see this report by Raymond Ibrahim.)
The ramifications can be momentous for Muslims and non-Muslims alike: consider the difference in opinion between the Saudi leaders and Usama Bin Ladin concerning the presence of American soldiers in the Kingdom after the invasion of Kuwait. Bin Ladin opposed this infidel ‘occupation’. In his 1996 fatwa declaring war on America he counted the presence of US soldiers as “one of the worst catastrophes to befall the Muslims” since the death of Muhammad.
Saudia Arabia’s Grand Mufti and supreme religious authority Sheikh Ibn Baz, however, allowed American troops into Saudi Arabia, although in another fatwa he had stated that Christian servants could not be employed in Arabia:

“It is not allowed to have a non-Muslim maid. It is not allowed to have a non-Muslim male or a non-Muslim female servant, or a worker who is a non-Muslim for anyone living in the Arabian peninsula. This is because the Prophet Muhammad ordered the Jews and Christians to be expelled from that land. He ordered that only Muslims should be left there. He decreed upon his death that all polytheists must be expelled from this Peninsula. (Islamic Fatawa Regarding Women, p. 36 compiled by Abdul Malik Mujahid).

Both Usama Bin Ladin and the Saudi authorities agreed on the principle that infidels could not be permitted to live in Saudi Arabia. What they disagreed on was how to balance this against other requirements, such as the need to safeguard the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This difference was enough to trigger Bin Ladin’s war on America.
What distinguishes a jihadi terrorist from a more peaceful Muslim, therefore, may not be any fundamental difference in belief, but, as in the West, merely in a given instance, how the religious legal principles of his faith should be applied.

Mark Durie is an Anglican vicar in Melbourne, Australia, and an Associate Fellow at the Middle Eastern Forum.

Mark Durie is an Anglican pastor and author of The Third Choice: Islam, Dhimmitude and Freedom.

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