‘No one to hand power to in Syria’
by Michael Jansen | Sep 26, 2012 | 22:35
The citizens of Benghazi who raised the flag of revolt in 2011 are driving Salafist militiamen out of their city as Turkey is funnelling Salafist, jihadist and Al Qaeda fighters into Syria.
The post-Qadhafi multiplicity of militias of a variety of hues  tribal, opportunistic and religion-based  has transformed Libya into a land of insecurity and uncertainty. This has also happened in Syria even though the Assad government remains in charge in Damascus and looks as though it will stay on for some time. Its aim is to fight the rebels to a standstill until their backers say “enough†and press them to engage in talks.
There is no question of the rebels halting their campaign and surrendering. These groups contend they will continue the fight until the regime falls, whatever the cost to Syria and to the neighbouring countries due to spillover from the conflict.
Fearing a regional catastrophe, the Western countries backing the rebels have been pressing them to unite under a single command. Last week’s relocation to Syrian territory by commanders of the Ankara-fostered Free Syrian Army (FSA) was a last-ditch effort by its leading figures to preserve the FSA, whose gesture is too little, too late. It was promptly dismissed by the spokesman of Al Tawhid Brigade in Aleppo, one of the chief rebel groups who took a dim view of the shift and complained that reinforcements were needed, not a bunch of defected officers who have been living comfortably in southern Turkey.
The Western powers and Turkey have, finally, come to understand that the FSA is unable to impose unity, and command and control on the disparate militias which, only when under extreme pressure from the Syrian army, coordinate operations.
Instead of thinking up a fresh strategy to impose order on the militias, Turkey, France and the US are now trying to form a group called the Syrian National Army under Maj. Gen. Mohammad Hajj Ali.
So far this effort has not got off the ground and could be as useless as the FSA as a structure for pulling together the disparate groups fighting the government.
Since the FSA was established at the end of July 2011, scores of militia groups have sprung up all over Syria. Some experts estimate their number at 2,000, others at 200. Most are local and commanded by local figures with their own agendas. Some have become warlords.
To complicate the picture, the Muslim Brotherhood and members of the expatriate opposition coalition, the Syrian National Council (SNC), have raised their own militias.
The militias embody the entire political spectrum, from secular liberals to Al Qaeda religious radicals, and find it difficult to cooperate or even get along when operating in the same location.
While the majority of rebels in the field are Syrians who say they want a “civil†state, there is a growing body of Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist fighters who advocate transforming Syria into an “Islamic stateâ€Â. These groups are competing for recruits, aid and arms, and occasionally clash over supplies.
Media savvy militias generally do better than more low-profile ones, creating antagonism and tension. Competition is exacerbated by Arab sponsors of the militias, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which have favourites.
There are at least 3,500 foreign fighters from the Gulf, Tunisia, Chechnya, Somalia, Sudan and Libya. Most are based in the northwest. Libyans make up the largest contingent, numbering 1,300. The common rebel goal is to topple the Syrian regime, but few insurgent leaders seem to have a thought for what will happen if and when this end is achieved.
The SNC is split between Brotherhood members who favour an Islamic state and secularists who do not. The SNC itself has little political support within Syria.
The Brotherhood, allied to Qatar, has limited Syrian popular support, while the Saudis have boosted the Salafists who spring from local communities.
In a bid to bypass the weak and divided SNC, some dissidents met in Amman with the aim of creating a new political leadership under defected prime minister Riyad Hijab. Brig. General Mohammad Al Hajj was to head the Free Army command and take charge of field operations. This effort seems to have fizzled out.
Meanwhile, last weekend’s conference in Damascus revealed that the domestic opposition is no more able to create a united front or a clear action plan than the expatriate opposition or the rebel forces on the ground.
Permitted by the government and backed by Russia, China and Iran, this gathering, originally expected to embrace 28 groups, turned into a meeting of 16 groups chaired by the National Coordination Board (NCB) when Building the Syrian State, Maan and other factions pulled out.
It is interesting to note that the NCB called for President Bashar Assad to step down, as well as for a peaceful transition to a post-Baath form of governance. The NCB also reaffirmed its commitment to the policy of “no communalism, no militarisation, and no external intervention† a line adopted by most of the mainly leftist internal opposition groups.
It is tragic that these groups were unable to get together because they could provide a viable domestic alternative to the present government, while neither the SNC nor the hundreds of rebel factions are capable of guiding a transition.
As long as there is no credible successor on the scene, it is unlikely that Assad and his entourage will agree to hand over power. While he said he would be willing to step down after an election, some supporters claim he would go if his departure would not plunge the country into total chaos and anarchy. However, it is not clear whether his inner circle would allow him to do this.
Although Libya, like Syria, was afflicted by scores of militias, some with their own agendas, Libya had an alternative to Muammar Qadhafi in the Transitional National Council made up of men from both inside the country and abroad, men who enjoyed credibility, popular support and foreign backing.
None of the political or military players on the Syrian scene enjoys this combination of attributes.
In a perceptive article about Assad, published in Foreign Policy, David Lesch, an academic who knows him reasonably well, quoted Anne Applebaum writing about former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. She observed that if there is to be a peaceful transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, there have to be “an elite willing to hand over power and an alternative elite organised enough to accept itâ€Â.
In Syria, neither is present.
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